This case revolves around a signature, or, more accurately, the lack of one. The story begins in 1990, when Norman Leslie Miller married Beth Miller. Unfortunately, things didn’t work out, and in 2004, Beth filed a complaint for divorce in Delaware County. Norman responded with a counterclaim for divorce.
The case was referred to Magistrate Lianne Sefcovic. Eventually the two sides reached an agreement that contained a number of handwritten revisions. Norman and Beth initialed each of those revisions, then both of them — and their attorneys — signed the agreement. In the space for the judge’s signature, Magistrate Sefcovic signed Judge Everett Krueger’s name, followed by Sefcovic’s initials.
Norman and Beth also filed an agreement for a shared-parenting plan. They, and their attorneys, signed it. And again, Sefcovic signed the judge’s name and initialed it.
In October 2005, the trial court adopted the divorce agreement and incorporated it with the final divorce decree. Yet again, Sefcovic signed for the judge, then initialed it.
In March 2007, Norman asked for — and received — a recalculation of child support. In August 2007, Beth got remarried, relying on that original divorce decree to obtain a new marriage license. Norman did the same a year later. Up to that point, neither party contested the validity of the original divorce decree to resolve any of these issues.
But that all changed in April 2009, when Beth filed a motion to vacate the 2005 divorce decree and the 2004 agreement with the handwritten revisions. She argued that the entries were void for failure to comply with one of the Civil Rules of Procedure, which govern Ohio’s court process. Specifically, she argued that the court had failed to comply with Civil Rule 58(A) due to the improper signature by Sefcovic in place of Krueger.
In response to Beth’s motion, the court held an evidentiary hearing. Afterward, a magistrate issued a decision upholding the validity of the divorce decree and the 2004 agreement. The magistrate stated that Krueger had validly authorized and directed Sefcovic to provide his signature for agreed-upon entries.
After the trial court adopted that decision, Beth filed an appeal with the court of appeals. While the appeal was pending there was a further wrinkle in the case — Norman passed away on Jan. 25, 2010. His surviving spouse, Rebecca Nelson-Miller, was then substituted as a party in this matter.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, concluding that the civil rules do not permit a magistrate to enter judgments and that the trial court therefore did not have the authority to delegate the duty of signing agreed judgment entries. The court of appeals held that Civil Rule 58 requires the trial court’s signature, that a judgment without the signature of the trial court is simply not a judgment, and that the 2005 divorce decree was therefore void because it was not personally signed by the trial judge.
The case eventually came before us — the Supreme Court of Ohio — for a final review. By that time both parties conceded that the Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow the trial court to delegate its signatory duties to a magistrate. So the sole question before us was whether the improper signature caused the judgment to be void, or whether it was an error that renders the judgment merely voidable.
What’s the difference between whether a judgment is “void” or “voidable”? Our court has long held that the determination between void and voidable generally depends on “whether the Court rendering the judgment has jurisdiction.”
In a case going all the way back to 1848, our court stated that the “distinction is between the lack of power or want of jurisdiction in the court, and a wrongful or defective execution of power. In the first instance all acts of the Court not having jurisdiction or power are void.” Thus, a judgment is generally void only when the court rendering the judgment lacks jurisdiction over the parties. When the court lacks jurisdiction, “the act or judgment of the Court is wholly void, and is as though it had not been done.”
On the other hand, a “voidable” judgment is one rendered by a court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction or jurisdiction over the particular case due to error or irregularity. When there is an error, the judgment must be reversed; when there is an irregularity, it must be corrected by filing a motion.
Based on our decisions in several cases similar to Norman’s and Beth’s, we concluded that the lack of a valid signature is an irregularity, which meant that in their case the judgment was rendered voidable rather than void.
In reaching this decision, we also noted that there were public-policy reasons supporting our conclusion. First, we have a strong interest in preserving the finality of judgments. Finality produces “certainty in the law and public confidence in the system’s ability to resolve disputes.”
If delayed attacks such as this one were possible, domestic court decisions would be perpetually open to attack, and finality would be impossible. As Justice Yvette McGee Brown noted in writing for the majority, the parties in this case “received full notice of the merits of the 2004 agreed entry and 2005 divorce decree, the defective signature was easily discoverable, it in no way infringed on the parties’ due-process rights, and the parties explicitly relied on the validity of the underlying divorce in order to remarry.”
Second, a declaration by our court that every divorce decree that does not fully comply with Civil Rule 58 is void would be “pregnant with fearful consequences.” Hundreds or thousands of uncontested divorces will be affected by this decision.
“Long-reaching consequences would affect later marriages, children, all subsequent tax filings, inheritances, property divisions ... and numerous other proceedings and rights.” To declare all divorce decrees with faulty signatures to be void “would create absolute chaos.”
For those reasons — by a 7-to-0 vote — we reversed the decision of the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court’s 2005 entry decree of divorce.